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Rethinking the Revolution:
Competitive Telephony in a Voice over Internet
Protocol Era
JARED S. DINKEs*
As telecommunication platforms converge and new technologies emerge,
there has been a call for new legislation to repeal much of the current
telecommunications regulatory structure. Many proponents of change have
emphasized the need for a relaxed regulatory approach to allow for
innovation and investment while diminishing the prospects for regulatory
arbitrage. Opponents of market-oriented approaches emphasize the need
for regulatory oversight of new technologies to ensure quality of service,
reliability, and access to social services. Within this debate, the uncertain
regulatory status of applications such as Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) and other IP-enhanced services are often cited as examples of how
the current regulatory structure could stymie the deployment and
development of emerging technologies. While such examples are useful in
advancing the cause of market-oriented approaches for emerging
technologies, these arguments are seldom applied to legacy networks
because of technological differences.
This Note will examine the rapid changes in the telecommunications
industry due to emerging technologies, most notably VoIP. This analysis
will demonstrate why the future of telephony must not lie within the
regulatory framework of the past. Despite the technical differences in their
transmission technologies and in the potential capabilities of both forms of
telephony, many of the arguments supporting a relaxed regulatory regime
for VoIP provide insight into the failures of Public Switched Telephone
Network regulation. Using the arguments regarding VoIP regulation as a
framework for analysis, it will be possible to see how local exchange service
may benefit from the same relaxed regulatory approach advocated by some
VoIP proponents. In so doing, the promise of effective intramodal local
competition could be realized. Finally, this Note explains how the VoIP
debate provides a framework for rethinking what regulations should be
necessary under a new regulatory scheme. Such a framework would
eliminate most economic regulation while maintaining some social
regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade after the extensive reforms of the Federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA),' American consumers are
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beginning to realize dramatic changes to their telecommunications landscape.
Ironically, most of these changes are not the result of the FTA, which sought,
among other things, to foster competition within traditional local and long
distance telephony through deregulation.2 While competition in long distance
markets is fairly robust, local competition lags far behind.3 Additionally, a
ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia4
that is advantageous to incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) 5 makes it
most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal. Special thanks to my mother Sharon,
sister Stephanie, future brother-in-law Ernest Wechsler, Benjamin Dinkes, Gale and
George Ressler, and Bob and Nancy Arnson for their encouragement and support
throughout the writing process. I am indebted to Jason Job and Jack Gravelle for their
guidance, input, and thoughtful comments. Thanks to Professor Peter Shane for helping
me form a research question. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Ilana Ressler. Without her
support, suggestions, patience, encouragement, love, daily scouring of the New York
Times for telephone articles, and feigned interest in VolP, I would never have been able
to complete this Note. Any errors or inaccuracies remain my own.
I Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, 813
PLIfPAT 453, 476-81 (2004) (examining the effect of the FTA on market strategy and
structure). See also JAMES SHAw, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION 38-58 (1998)
(providing a brief analysis of the basic structure of the 1996 Act one year after its
implementation).
3 As of June 2004, competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) provided service to
only 17.8% of the traditional telephone lines; the remaining 82.2% of consumers received
service from the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 8-5 (2005),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/trend605.pdf [hereinafter TELEPHONE TRENDS]. Conversely, in the
competitive long distance market, AT&T, which once exercised monopoly power over
the long distance market, has seen its residential market-share fall from 74.6% in 1995 to
31.7% in 2003. Id. at 9-12. These numbers should shift dramatically with the closing of
the proposed merger of SBC and AT&T as well as that of Verizon and MCI. See Shawn
Young & Jesse Drucker, Telecom Mergers Limit Choices of Customers, WALL ST. J., Feb.
4, 2005, at B 1. See also Shawn Young, Qwest Declares It Won't Contest Verizon's MCI
Bid, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2005, at B4 (reporting a Qwest company statement released
shortly before a Verizon shareholder meeting that it will not revive its bid for MCI even if
shareholders vote to reject the merger).
4 U.S. Telecom Ass'n. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter USTA II] (holding that the FCC may not grant state utility commissions the
power to make unbundling decisions and that ILECs are not required to provide
discounted unbundled access to CLECs absent special circumstances indicating
impairment).
5 The FTA defines ILEC:
with respect to an area, the local exchange carrier that-(A) on February 8, 1996,
provided telephone exchange service in such area; and (B)(i) on February 8, 1996,
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unlikely that the state of competition in the traditional local telephone market
will experience any dramatic changes in the near future, outside of the
possibilities of congressional overhaul or merger activity.6
Although the prospects for a competitive market in residential local
calling seem remote, other technological developments may provide
alternatives which were not envisioned by the FTA. The internet has
fundamentally shifted the way millions of Americans interact with one
another and appears on the cusp of providing a challenge to traditional public
switched telephone network (PSTN) usage. 7 Internet telephony, commonly
referred to as Voice over Internet Protocol (VolP), has catapulted from near
obscurity to a viable alternative that is beginning to compete with traditional
telephony. The rise of VolP, in combination with the rapidly expanding
wireless telephone market, has led some scholars to argue that the
competition envisioned by the FTA will likely arise from intermodal rather
than intramodal competition. 8
was deemed to be a member of the exchange carrier association pursuant to section
69.601(b) of the Commission's regulations (47 C.F.R. 69.601(b)); or (ii) is a person
or entity that, on or after February 8, 1996, became a successor or assign of a
member described in clause (i).
47 U.S.C. § 25 1(h) (2000).
6 See TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra note 3. The proposed merger of SBC and AT&T, as
well as that of Verizon and MCI, could decrease competition in what is otherwise a fairly
robust long distance market. See Young & Drucker, supra note 3. Additionally, the
migration of some of AT&T's local customers to SBC may lead to even less competition
within the market for residential local calling.
7 The growth of both internet usage and broadband connections, although somewhat
lower than initial estimates, is nonetheless dramatic. The Pew Internet & American Life
Project currently estimates that 68% of all adult Americans go online. Pew Internet &
American Life Project, Demographics of Internet Users,
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends/User Demo_08.09.05.htm (last visited Sept. 10,
2005). As of February 2004, over 48 million American adults (roughly 24% of the
population) had high speed internet connections in their homes, an increase of nearly 60%
from March of 2003 when 30 million American adults had high speed internet access in
their homes. JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET PROJECT, PEW INTERNET PROJECT
DATA MEMO 2 (April 2004),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPBroadbandO4.DataMemo.pdf. Much of this growth
may be attributed to the rise in digital subscriber line (DSL) usage which gained 14% of
the broadband market share (an increase from 28% to 42% from March 2003 to February
of 2004). Id. at 2. Despite this growth, "[t]he number of households with access to
broadband technology far outpaces the number of households that actually subscribe to
any form of broadband service." Enrico C. Soriano, Lee Tiedrich, Amy Levine & Emily
Hancock, A Look At Key Issues Currently Shaping Broadband Deployment and
Regulation, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., July 2004, at 1.
8 See James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1063, 1098, 1110 (2004) (arguing for telecommunications reform to
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The feasibility of such a competitive marketplace remains uncertain.
Some critics of current telephone regulation fear that states may seek to
regulate VolP by classifying it as a telephone service, thereby stunting its
growth.9 Aware of the potential for over-regulation, the FCC preempted an
order by the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission applying the state's
traditional "telephone company" regulations to Vonage Holdings Corp., a
provider of VolP, noting that because users of Vonage cannot be practically
located, their usage may not be considered intrastate commerce. 10 Despite the
FCC's Vonage Order, the Commission has yet to issue a final rule regarding
the classification of VolP as either a telecommunications or information
service under the FTA." l On the opposite side of this question, many state
regulatory commissions and consumers' rights advocates argue for an
increased state role to ensure that consumer issues, as well as emergency
service needs, will be sufficiently met by VoIP providers. 12
Often lost in the debate regarding the future of VolP is what the future of
the PSTN should hold if VolP grows as dramatically as some in the
communications industry predict. 13 This question is probably not often asked
decrease the legal and economic barriers to intermodal competition). Speta describes
intermodal competition as competition between telecommunications services that use
different platforms, for example the competition between cellular telephones and
traditional home telephones on the PSTN. See id. at 1108. Intramodal competition is
competition between telecommunications services that use the same platform, such as the
competition between an ILEC and a CLEC.
9 See Michael K. Powell, The Age of Personal Communications: "Power to the
People," 12 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 139, 142 (2004) ("The burden should be placed
squarely on government to demonstrate why regulation is needed, rather than on
-innovators to explain why it is not.").
10 Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004) [hereinafter Vonage].
I1 See id. at 2.
12 State utility commissions filed numerous comments in response to the FCC's
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. IP-Enabled Services, 19 F.C.C.R. 4863 (2004)
[hereinafter IP-Enabled Services].
13 Owners of transmission facilities such as cable companies, wireless telephone
companies, and traditional telephone companies are predicting the substantial growth of
VolP. For example, AT&T planned to provide VolP service in 100 markets in 2004 and
predicted a customer enrollment of over one million within two years. Shawn Young,
AT&T to Launch Internet-Based Telephone Service, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, at B6.
Comcast, America's largest cable provider, hopes to generate $3.8 billion annually in
revenue within five years if it reaches its target of attracting eight million subscribers to
its VolP service. Peter Grant, Comcast Aims to Dial Up Profit--and Growth, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 11, 2005, at C1. Time Warner expected to offer VolP service to a majority of its 10.9
million customers in twenty-seven states by the end of 2004. Mark Wigfield, It Looks
Like a Duck; Or Does It? Should Regulators Treat Internet Phone Service Like a Phone
or the Internet? Its Future May Depend on the Answer, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004, at
R8. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) also plan to enter the market. For example,
America Online announced that it plans to offer VolP service to its 22 million subscribers
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because VolP's strongest proponents, who generally seek a hands-off
approach to its regulation, view VoP as the future of all telephony; while
state and consumer advocates, often supporters of regulation, view VoP as
performing the same function as traditional telephony and believe that it
should be subject to the same regulation. 14 If either rationale prevails, local
exchange regulation will likely remain static. As such, the future of local
competition within the PSTN, a network that millions of Americans will
continue to use despite the availability of VoP and wireless telephone
options, is increasingly murky.
Amidst this uncertainty, it is possible to gain a greater understanding of
the future of PSTN regulation through examining the arguments surrounding
VoP's regulation. Despite the technical differences in their transmission
technologies and in the potential capabilities of both forms of telephony,
many of the arguments supporting a relaxed regulatory regime for Vol
provide insight into some of the failures of PSTN regulation. Such an
approach may prove particularly useful given the increasingly blurry line
between PSTN and VolP telephony as well as the common concerns that the
regulation of both present.15 Noting this convergence in a 2004 VolP hearing,
Senator John McCain explained:
In many ways, VolP is a microcosm of the broad array of
telecommunications regulatory issues that have been debated since passage
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including the role of state
regulators, the legal classification of services, universal service, access
charges, emergency services and access by people with disabilities. 16
and then to expand its service offerings to non-subscribers. Julia Angwin, Christopher
Rhoads & Scott Thurm, AOL to Launch Net Phone Service, Giving VoIP a Mainstream
Name, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at A3. Current users of America Online, as well as
users of its Instant Messenger service, may also use VolP to chat with other users,
regardless of location. One analyst predicts that the market for VolP, which was
estimated at $517 million in 2004, will be $1.92 billion in 2005 and will explode to $9.5
billion by 2008. Roger Cheng, Battle Is on for Web-Calling Market, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
2004, at B2C.
14 Explaining the rationale for increased state regulation, James Bradford Ramsey,
general counsel of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC), notes that if VolP becomes a significant substitute for traditional telephony,
"consumers will want to be able to call state regulators" to complain about their service.
Wigfield, supra note 13.
15 Some PSTN-based calls are actually routed over the intemet without the customer
being aware. See IP-Enabled Services, supra note 12, at 10.
16 Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transportation, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. John
McCain, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation).
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Adapting PSTN regulation through the lens of the Vol? debate will allow
for market- and innovation-oriented solutions that move beyond the current
regime of fifty-one separate, 17 and sometimes contradictory, regulatory
schemes. Such adaptations may prove especially important if the market for
VolP is less competitive than its proponents anticipate.
This Note will examine the rapid changes in the telecommunications
industry due to emerging technologies, most notably VoP. This analysis will
demonstrate why the future of telephony must not lie within the regulatory
framework of the past. Using the arguments regarding VolP regulation as a
framework for analysis it will be possible to see how traditional telephony
may benefit from a more relaxed regulatory approach. Rather than placing
VoP and other IP-enhanced services within the FTA, it is time for a new act
addressing the new realities of the telecommunications industry. 18 Such an
act should dramatically reduce the role that state utility commissions play in
PSTN regulation while addressing concerns regarding universal service as
well as access to emergency services. Reducing the regulatory role of
individual states will allow for innovation in all areas of telephony and
remove VoP's regulatory advantage without sacrificing innovation and
investment.
Part II of this Note will provide background concerning the technical
aspects of both Vol and the PSTN. Part III will trace the development of the
PSTN from its beginnings through the development of an industry-wide
monopoly, concluding with the successes and failures of the more recent era
of deregulation by the FTA. Part IV will examine changes to America's
17 This total includes fifty state utility commissions and the FCC.
18 Such a suggestion has been gaining momentum amongst regional Bells as well as
high ranking members of Congress. See Stephen Labaton, Telecom: Eight-Year-Old
Basic Law May Be Outdated Already, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at C13 (noting a
Congressional and industry desire to revamp the FTA, despite a lack of consensus of
exactly what reform should entail). On September 15, 2005, the House of Representatives
Energy and Commerce Committee released draft legislation updating the FTA by
providing new laws goveming broadband services including VoIP as well as broadband
based video services. H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, Staff Discussion Draft (Sept.
15, 2005), http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/News/09152005_staff disc.pdf. The
Progress and Freedom Foundation (PFF), a self-described, "market-oriented think tank
that studies the digital revolution and its implications for public policy," launched a
bipartisan effort to draft a model communications act named the "Digital Age
Communications Act" (DACA) on February 1, 2005. Copies of the working papers are
available at http://www.pff.org/daca/. The PFF has called for a new regulatory regime
similar to the antitrust model of regulation. A full version of the proposed legislation is
available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/050617regframework.pdf. See also
Anne Marie Squeo, Phone Companies Push Telecom Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
2005, at A4 (noting a telecommunications industry desire to revamp the FTA).
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telecommunications industry resulting from rapid technological development
and the merging of voice, video, and data transmission into one platform.
Finally, Part V will argue for regulatory parity amongst older and emerging
technologies. This will be accomplished by addressing the arguments
surrounding the regulatory status of VoW and asking why these arguments
should not apply to traditional telephony. Through this discussion, it will be
possible to see that the failings of the current regulatory approach apply not
only to emerging technologies that erode regulatory classifications, but also
to the very technologies that have been regulated through this approach for
over seventy years.
II. BACKGROUND
For much of its history, the mechanics of telephone service in the United
States have remained relatively stagnant.19 Traditional telephony is routed
over the PSTN which connects individual home units to a local exchange
carrier (LEC) that provides the major switch servicing for a large geographic
area.20 A local call is routed through the LEC to another telephone within the
exchange.21 For long distance, calls are routed through an interexchange
carrier (IXC) which routes traffic from one exchange to another.22 The actual
transmission of PSTN telephony is therefore direct and hierarchical, meaning
that the passage of a call over copper wire, microwave, or fiber optic cable
may be traced from end to end, with the signal actually traveling over a
specific route between participants in the conversation. 23
Additionally, voice is transmitted over telephone wires (or through the
air in the case of microwave) at the speed of light as an analog signal that is
then decoded by the telephone.24 During a telephone conversation, a channel
of fixed bandwidth remains open allowing individuals to speak with one
another,25 and no other content may travel on the line.26 If there is a break in
19 For a discussion of the evolution of the PSTN as well as a description of the
telecommunications networks of the future see, Douglas Sicker, The End of Federalism in
Telecommunications Regulations?, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 130, 133-53 (2005).
2 0 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN & HOwARD A. SHELANSKI,




24 Id. at 26-27.
25 See Economides, supra note 2, at 493.
26 Robert S. Metzger & Benjamin P. Broderick, Communications Convergence,
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Oct. 2001, at 1.
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this channel, then the signal will have no alternative route. This ability for
end-to-end analysis of the complete analog signal allows for a separation of
calls that are interstate from those that are exclusively intrastate.
Although VoIP may serve the same function as the PSTN and, through
the use of adaptors, is compatible with it, VoIP's method of voice
transmission differs dramatically. As its name indicates, VoIP transmits
voice over the internet in the form of internet protocol. Its transmission is
essentially no different from other forms of information transmitted over the
internet such as instant messages, video, e-mail, or information accessed on
the world wide web. Rather than transmit information in complete analog
form, VoIP transfers bits of voice in packets which are individually
addressed and sent over physical networks that may be composed of copper,
fiber, coaxial cable, or wireless facilities.27 VoIP users may use a
microphone connected to their computer, a VoIP-specific telephone,28 or an
adaptor that allows for the use of a conventional telephone.29 Unlike the
27 IP-Enabled Services, supra note 12, at 8.
28 Both Sprint PCS and Verizon's "push to talk" wireless telephones utilize VoIP to
transmit voice between users rather than the PSTN. Id. at 14.2 9 VolP does not necessarily need to connect to the PSTN. The earliest VoIP
applications did not do so and such connection is available only through the use of an
adaptor. The advantage of connectivity to the PSTN is that it enables a Vole user to
contact or be contacted by any person on the switched network. There are free services
available, such as pulver.com's Free World Dialup (FWD), which is already the subject
of an FCC order declaring it an information service and not subject to legacy regulations.
pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications Nor a
Telecommunications Service, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307 (2004). FWD is a free service that allows
users to speak with other members of the service through Vol in the same manner as an
instant message. Although FWD is the subject of an FCC order, the most widely used
PC-to-PC VoIP program is Skype. Skype is a free program that allows users to speak to
one another using a microphone, headset, or conventional telephone. Ethan Todras-
Whitehill, When A Stranger Calls From Afar or Nearby; An Internet Phone Service
Creates A Network of Users Willing to Advise, Tutor or Simply Chat with All Comers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at G1. Skype users may also place calls to traditional
telephone lines worldwide at low rates. See Seth Schiesel, The Future Calls, and'Mom
Says Call Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2005, at G3. Skype also offers a voice mail service
and allows users to set up a telephone number so that conventional telephone users may
call Skype users. James Fallows, TECHNO FILES: An Update on Stuff.That's Cool (Like
Google's Photo Maps), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, § 3:5. As of August 2005, Skype has
fifty-one million users. Amanda Bower & Laura A. Locke, Catching Up to Stay Ahead,
TIME, Sept. 5, 2005, at 53. Skype is so popular and disruptive to other forms of telephony
in Europe that Vodafone's German cell phone division has stated it will cease connecting
calls placed from Skype to its customers in July 2007. Ben Chamy, VoIP Backlash In
Germany?, NEWS.COM, July 13, 2005,
http://news.com.com/VoIP+backlash+in+Germany/2100-7352_3-5786976.html. Skype
was acquired by EBay for $2.6 billion in September 2005. Mylene Mangalindan, EBay
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hierarchical structure of the PSTN, the transmission of data over the internet
is horizontal, meaning that data transmission does not follow a "permanent or
exclusive" path from its sender to its recipient. 30 Routers read packet
addresses individually and decide the optimal path of transmission for each
packet.31 If part of a network is not functioning properly, the routers will seek
an alternative path for the packets to travel. As such, there is no dedicated
switch for a given conversation and packets from the same conversation may
take different routes despite the constancy of all participants to the
conversation. 32 Upon receipt, the packets of information are reassembled by
the computers or adaptors of the participants in the conversation. 33 Through
this transformation, VolP can carry significantly more information in a more
efficient manner than analog transmission over the PSTN. This efficiency
translates into lower costs for providers and users,34 as well as enhanced
services throughout the conversation.
As an internet application, VolP can offer more features than traditional
telephony. The use of packets allows for enhanced conferencing capabilities
beyond three-way calling. Users of VolP may engage in conferencing in
more or less the same way in which they engage in online chatting. While
teleconferencing is currently available through the PSTN, such conferences
Draws Skype Skeptics on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005, at C1. America Online's
Instant Messenger offers VolP as well as video communication between users, as does
Apple's iChat software. David Pogue, Google Gets Better. What's Up With That?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at C1. Seeking to break into the VoIP market, Yahoo purchased a
closely held VolP company and Google has released Google Talk. Kevin J. Delaney,
Yahoo Buys Firm That Offers Calls From PC to Phone, WALL ST. J., Jun. 15, 2005, at
B5; Mylene Mangalindan & Christopher Rhoads, Google to Introduce Instant Messaging,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at B3. Also, Microsoft's X-Box Live allows video game
players to speak with other players (participating in the same game) through VolP.
Powell, supra note 9, 'at 141. Such services resemble the early exclusive switched
networks that gave rise to calls for PSTN monopoly to create connections between
exchanges.
3 0 IP-Enabled Services, supra note 12, at 8.
3 Id.
321Id.
33 Wigfield, supra note 13.
34 Vonage, currently the largest provider of VolP service, sells unlimited local and
long distance service for a monthly charge of $25, nearly one-half the price of
comparable PSTN service. Vonage is expected to lose its status as America's leading
VolP provider as more cable and television companies enter the market. While some of
these companies plan to compete for VolP through price, others plan to use bundling,
name recognition, and additional services to lure customers to packages that are only a
modest discount from PSTN prices. Ben Hunt, Comment & Analysis, Improved
Technology Means that the Race to Provide Customers With a Single Package of Voice,
Video and Data Services Is Hotting Up, Write Paul Taylor and Aline Van Duyn, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at 15.
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require operator assistance. In contrast, a VoIP user may arrange a
conference call with the click of a mouse. 35 VoIP also provides advanced call
forwarding techniques. Rather than routing a call on the switched network to
a single other number, VoIP has the capacity for multiple numbers to be tried
while forwarding a call.36 Voice messaging through VoIP will also be more
enhanced than what is currently available through the PSTN. VoP users may
receive their messages through e-mail in the form of a .wav file.37 Through
this feature, VoP users will have nearly instantaneous access to their
messages without the need to call and check. Finally, screening of calls also
differs with VoIP because users may set parameters for which calls will be
allowed to go through at a particular time and which will be sent directly to
voice mail. 38 The extent to which these services will be desired by consumers
remains to be seen; nonetheless, their availability provides VoP with a
competitive advantage.
Resulting from the horizontal organization of internet protocol, the
traditional fixed location of a subscriber line disappears. Instead of needing
to be at home to use one's "home" telephone, a VoIP subscriber simply needs
a broadband internet connection (and a receiver of some kind) to place calls
from her "home" number.39 This process is equivalent to accessing any
internet service such as world wide web-based e-mail, digital media, or
instant messaging. Also, by routing calls through the internet rather than the
PSTN, subscribers may choose their area code because such numbers are not
needed for PSTN routing purposes.40 Individuals living away from friends
and relatives as well as businesses operating out of a particular region could
choose an exchange to limit long distance charges, simulate presence in a
particular market, or even create virtual call centers.4 1
VoIP's portability makes traditional end-to-end analysis untenable. If a
caller can choose her area code and be in any location with a broadband
connection when placing a call, it becomes much more difficult to separate
interstate from intrastate conversations. Even if a caller places a "local" call
35 Peter Grant, Ready for Prime Time, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2004, at R7.
3 6 See id.
37 See id. See generally NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 880 (19th ed. 2003) ("A
Wave File is a Microsoft Windows proprietary format for encoding sound.").
38 In terms of practicality, this feature is more likely to appeal to business rather than
residential customers. Business customers may use this feature to prioritize certain calls
to a call center over others.
39 Grant, supra note 35.
4 0 Wigfield, supra note 13.
41 See id. For example, JetBlue Airways, a discount airline, has all of its reservations
agents work from home using VolP telephones. Grant, supra note 35.
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from her home, the horizontal structure of internet protocol could route
packets from the conversation anywhere in the world.42 This applies to users
of the PSTN as well, because a telephone call to a person with the same area
code could actually be an interstate or even international call. Without a
switched connection, the line between interstate and intrastate becomes
tenuous. Even if such tracking were possible, the resources that VolP
providers would have to devote to accounting for packet traffic would likely
be better spent on development geared toward satisfying the dictates of the
market rather than on a state regulator.
The technological differences between VolP and traditional telephony
leave VolP with a competitive advantage over calls routed over the PSTN. 43
To combat this advantage, providers of PSTN service will likely need to
adapt to the demands of a more competitive marketplace. Such adaptation is
likely to come in the form of infrastructure upgrades moving from the copper
wire of the PSTN to fiber optic networks. 44 If such massive technological
investments will be necessary, they could sound the death knell for CLEC's
who will be unable to compete with ILECs and already possess limited
bargaining power to negotiate advantageous lease rates for unbundled
network elements (UNEs).45 Indeed, prior to its agreement to merge with
SBC, AT&T stopped soliciting new local customers after a federal court held
that ILECs were not required to offer subsidized rates for leasing network
elements.46
42 The FCC used this logic in its Vonage Order. Vonage, supra note 10, at 24-25.
43 The advantages of VoIP are most apparent within the market for business
telephone services. Anticipating the widespread use of VoIP rather than private branch
exchanges (PBXs), producers of business telephone systems have focused much of their
attention on VoIP telephones. The technology consulting firm Yankee Group estimated
that by the end of 2004 nearly 20% of new phones shipped to U.S. businesses would use
VoIP. Grant, supra note 35. It is believed that this percentage will increase to over 50%
by 2007, and eventually virtually all phones shipped to U.S. businesses will use VoP. Id.
According to one estimate, shipments of Enterprise VoIP lines passed the 50% threshold
in the third quarter of 2004. David Yedwab, VoIP Enterprise Shipments Crack 50%,
TELEPHONY ONLINE, Jan. 19, 2005,
http://telephonyonline.com/news/voipenterprise-shipments/index.html.
44 For a discussion of efforts by ILECs to improve their service offerings in response
to potential VoIP competition from cable companies, see infra Part [V.A.
45 A UNE may be defined as, "[a] part ('element') of a telephone network, such as a
switch or customer loop, that the 1996 Act [FTA] requires ILECs to lease to CLECs at
cost-based rates." BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN & SHELANSKI, supra note 20, at 1056.
4 6 Mark D. Schneider, Marc A. Goldman & Kathleen R. Hartnett, The USTA
Decisions and the Rise and Fall of Telephone Competition, COMM. LAW., Summer 2004,
at 1,23.
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Despite the advantages that ILECs possess over CLECs, PSTN service
will be further hampered through the current scheme of telephone regulation.
As long as VoIP's primary purpose is to serve as a platform for telephony,
then a truly competitive market should mandate that both services be
regulated in a similar fashion. Rather than traveling down the current path of
placing new technologies into old regulatory classifications required by the
FTA, it is a time for a new telecommunications act that emphasizes
competition and limits state regulatory authority. In drafting a new act,
Congress should look to the successes and failures of the FTA, emerging
technologies, and the arguments surrounding the regulation of VoIP to
predict how to best balance public goods with the needs of technological
investment and innovation.
III. THE QUEST FOR PSTN COMPETITION
The current state of telephony is the product of a history filled with
regulation, and more recently, deregulation. To argue for changes to the
current state of telephone regulation, it is first necessary to understand how
previous views of telephony have shaped the regulatory treatment of the
PSTN. While examining telephony's past, one should consider that the
technology of the telephone does not necessarily determine the competitive
market in which telephone service must exist. The history of telephony is
filled with instances in which more foresight by either competing operators
or regulators could have yielded a market quite different than the AT&T
monopoly that emerged. Once one develops an understanding of telephony's
past and present, it will be possible to look toward the future possibilities of
competitive telephony.
A. A Condensed History of Telephone Regulation
Despite a tradition of monopoly and regulation, the most nascent stages
of telephone development were marked by a vibrant and competitive market.
The design for the telephone was first patented by Alexander Graham Bell in
1876 and telephones began being installed for commercial purposes in
1877. 47 Notwithstanding the billions of dollars that Bell's invention would
47 Although Bell is today considered the inventor of the telephone, there was also
significant work done for Western Electric (a subsidiary of Western Union) by Elisha
Gray. Both Gray and Bell researched telegraphs and determined that it would be possible
to transmit voice over wire. Interestingly, both Gray and Bell filed patents for their
inventions on February 17, 1876. It has been alleged but never proven that Bell, the first
of the two to file, changed his application after Gray's filing because an employee at the
patent office provided him with a copy of Gray's application. Later litigation upheld
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ultimately generate, Bell and his investors lacked sufficient capital to launch
a large telephone network. 48.As a result, this small group formed the Bell
Telephone Company-the company that would eventually become the
American -Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T).49 The Bell
Telephone Company focused on building telephone equipment to be leased
to franchisees who agreed to install the wires connecting their customers to
one another.50
The Bell Company faced early competition from Western Union which
also held patents on telephone technology. 51 During this brief period of
competition, Bell nearly went bankrupt as both firms competed for new
customers by improving their respective service offerings. 52 This competition
was relatively short-lived because Western Union cared more about
maintaining its dominance in the telegraph business than competing in the
new telephone market. 53 After Bell sued Western Union for patent
infringement, Western Union decided to leave the telephone business
altogether and agreed upon a settlement which gave Bell all of Western
Union's network (56,000 telephones in fifty-five cities), its telephone patents,
and forbade Western Union from re-entering the telephone market for
seventeen years.54 In exchange, Bell agreed not to enter the telegraph
Bell's 1876 patent and during its lifetime Bell's patent was upheld over 600 times. SUSAN
E. McMASTER, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 5-7 (2002).
4 8 Id. at9.
4 9 KEvIN G. WILSON, DEREGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS 14 (2000). Wilson
describes how the need for capital shaped Bell's corporate structure:
As the enterprise grew, it generated a number of corporate forms, each one dictated
by the need to increase the capitalization of the company. In quick succession
corporate entities were created and transformed. The precursor companies to the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), the future
telecommunications monolith, were the following: Bell Patent Association (1875),
Bell Telephone Company (Massachusetts association) (1877), New England
Telephone Company (1878), Bell Telephone Company (1878), National Bell
Telephone Company (1879), American Bell Telephone Company (1880), and
American Telephone & Telegraph Company (as a subsidiary of the American Bell
Telephone Company) (1885). In the short period between the creation of the Bell
Telephone Corporation in 1878 and the creation of the American Bell Telephone
Company in 1880, capitalization was increased from $450,000 to $7,350,000. In
addition to stock offerings, expansion was financed through the issuance of bonds
and debentures.
Id. (citations omitted).
5 0 MCNMASTER, supra note 47, at 9.
5 1 See id. at 10-12.
52 Id. at 11.
5 3 Id. at 12.
54 Id.
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business (which was more lucrative at that time), to transfer all telegraph
messages Bell received to Western Union unless a customer specified
otherwise, and payment of 20% of all telephone rental fees received by Bell
during the seventeen-year period (approximately seven million dollars).55
This agreement gave Bell a virtual monopoly until its patents expired in 1892
and 1893.56
After the expiration of Bell's patents, the 'market for telephony became
very competitive because 451 of 1002 cities in the United States with
telephone service had two or more telephone companies. 57 During this
period, Bell was close to bankruptcy on multiple occasions and saw revenues
steeply decline. 58 Competition continued to expand and a 1907 telephone
census indicated that the "independents" shared nearly half the market with
Bell. 59 Between 1894 and 1907, average telephone rates fell nearly 50% and
Bell experienced an 80% decline in average return on investment. 60 The Bell
companies responded to this increased competition with a refusal to
interconnect with non-affiliated networks, thereby denying "independent"
providers access to long distance service.61 Nonetheless, for a brief period, it
appeared possible that the benefits of the competitive market could be
enjoyed within the telephone industry.62
Bell's innovations in long distance technology and the shrewd business
practices of its president, Theodore Vail, saved Bell from declining
55 Id. The seven million dollar payment, even when adjusted for inflation, pales in
comparison to the eventual monopoly profits enjoyed by AT&T. AT&T eventually
acquired Western Union in 1910 for $30 million. PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K.
KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 12 (2d ed. 1999).
5 6 WILSON, supra note 49, at 15.
57 HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 55, at 12. See also WILSON, supra note
49, at 16 (describing the increased competition of this time, "In 1893 there were 266,431
telephone 'stations' (subscriber lines) in operation; all of them were owned by the Bell
companies. Ten years later the Bell System had burgeoned to 1,684,877 telephones, but
the total of all independents had nearly matched this expansion with 1,244,936
telephones."); MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 31 ("[P]rices declined greatly during the
period from 1894 through 1909. AT&T's prices decreased by 47.5 percent for businesses
and by 64.9 percent for residential customers in competitive areas.... In noncompetitive
areas, business rates decreased by 47.1 percent, residential rates by 57.6 percent.").
58 WILSON, supra note 49, at 16 ("In 1895 the average yearly revenue per station for
Bell was $88. By 1907 this had fallen to $43.").
59 HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 55, at 12.
60 Id.
61 WILSON, supra note 49, at 16.
62 MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 31.
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revenues. 63 The firm only allowed Bell affiliates to use its long distance
technology and he refused to sell equipment or to interconnect with non-Bell-
affiliated telephone companies.64 As Bell grew larger, its incentive to
interconnect with smaller networks decreased, causing consumers to place a
higher value on the use of Bell as a telephone provider rather than the
independent providers. 65 Bell's refusal to interconnect led businesses in the
early part of the twentieth century to use two or more phone lines to access
customers on different networks.66 Vail soon argued for the creation of a
central exchange, through which all users of the system could speak with one
another.67 This, it was argued, would keep costs low through the elimination
of redundant networks.68 It was from this logic that arguments for the PSTN
as a natural monopoly developed. Indeed, remnants of this argument are
present to this day in discussions of the last mile.
69
63 See id. at 40; WILSON, supra note 49, at 16-17. See also MCMASTER, supra note
47, at 17-19, 24-25.
64 HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 55, at 12.
65 In economic parlance this phenomenon is known as a "network effect." "Network
effects" have been described as "a group of theories clustered around the question
whether and to what extent standard economic theory must be altered in cases in which
'the utility that a user derives from consumption of a good increases with the number of
other agents consuming the good."' Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 483 (1998) (citing
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REv. 424,424 (1985)). Nicholas Economides notes: "Although not clearly
articulated in network economics terms, the issue facing the independents and AT&T was
clearly a fundamental issue in network economics." Economides, supra note 2, at 464.
66 See generally BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN & SHELANSKI, supra note 20, at 606.
67 See WILSON, supra note 49, at 18. Vail was fond of the phrase, "[o]ne system, one
policy, universal service," meaning that a national telephone network would work best if
it was administered by one firm that would submit to government regulation. Id. It is
important to note that Vail's phrase includes the term "universal service." It has been
argued that monopoly is necessary for the furnishing of universal service because
competitive firms would otherwise fail to operate in less populated rural areas. Id.
6 8 Id. See also BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN & SHELANSKI, supra note 20, at 606.
69 The last mile may be defined as "an imprecise term that typically means the
link-usually twisted pair-between an end-user and the telephone company central
office-local, long distance or Internet ... [I]t doesn't mean a 'mile,' since that 'mile'
could be less than a mile or several miles." NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra note
37, at 456. The last mile is often considered a natural monopoly because it theoretically
may be most efficiently provided by only one firm. As multiple firms enter the market,
the average cost per consumer becomes higher than if a single firm were to provide the
service because each competitor has fewer customers to share the expense of using the
network. BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN & SHELANSKI, supra note 20, at 374-78.
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Rather than focusing on internal expansion or licensing local affiliates, in
1907 AT&T began to acquire local operators.70 Around this time, AT&T also
began to sell equipment to non-affiliated local operators, marking a shift in
firm policy that was motivated by a desire to decrease transaction costs on
later acquisitions of local operators. 71 AT&T's acquisitions eventually drew
government suspicion, and in 1913 the firm reached a settlement with the
government known as the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913.72 Although
praised at the time because the agreement required interconnection with the
"independents," this agreement actually reduced telephone competition and
strengthened AT&T's market position by giving it a disproportionate share of
the fees related to interconnection.73 The passage of the Willis-Graham Act
in 1921 exempted the telephone industry from antitrust review of acquisitions
if the merger was approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). 74
AT&T used this Act to its benefit and between 1921 and 1934 received ICC
approval for 271 of 274 proposed mergers.75 By the end of the 1920s, AT&T
held 80% of the national telephony market-a monopoly position that it
would occupy for the next fifty years. 76
As a provider to a large majority of the U.S. telephone market, AT&T
submitted to state regulation in 1920.77 With the passage of the 1934
Communications Act, which created the FCC, AT&T began to be regulated
by the federal government as well. 78 The 1934 Act provided the framework
for telephone regulation that largely exists to this day. Even when changes to
the regulatory structure were introduced by the FTA, the FTA's approach to
regulatory classification was virtually identical to that of the 1934 Act.79
7 0 WILSON, supra note 49, at 16.
71 Id. AT&T's subsidiary, Western Electric, was the exclusive producer of
equipment to be used on the AT&T network. MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 19-20.72 See HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 55, at 16-18; WILSON, supra note
49, at 72-73; MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 37-38.
73 See HUBER, KELLOGG & THORNE, supra note 55, at 17; WILSON, supra note 49, at
17; MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 38.
74 MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 52.
7 5 1d.
761d.
77 Economides, supra note 2, at 469.
78 Prior to the 1934 Communications Act, the telephone industry was under the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Nonetheless, the ICC focused
much of its attention on the railroad industry. With the creation of the FCC, the telephone
industry received more extensive regulation. See MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 49.
79 The approach to regulation is often referred to as the "silo" approach because the
Act divides telecommunications into regimented areas. Depending upon the regulatory
classification of a particular area, a service receives varying degrees of regulatory
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Essential to the 1934 Act's approach was the notion of a telephone
provider as a common carrier. 80 As such, the 1934 Act created the FCC, "For
the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce by wire . . . so as
to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States a
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire ... communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." 81 To this end, the
FCC began establishing rules for the provision of telephone service.
AT&T maintained its monopoly status virtually unchallenged until the
government filed a lawsuit against AT&T and Western Electric alleging that
the two entities violated the Sherman Act by monopolizing and conspiring to
restrain trade in both telephone service and equipment markets.82 The result
of this action was a consent decree which provided an injunction precludirig
AT&T from entering into any business other than providing common carrier
services, allowed Western Electric only to produce equipment for the Bell
System, and required the licensing of AT&T and Western Electric patents to
any applicant willing to pay appropriate royalties.83  Despite the
government's efforts to combat AT&T's monopoly, the FCC and state utility
commissions continued to provide protection to local monopolies (mostly
controlled by AT&T)--preventing competition while also using cross-
subsidies to help give the telephone the ubiquitous status it enjoys to this
day. 84
Technological advances allowed competition to slowly re-enter the
telephone market. This competition emerged in the long distance market
oversight. See Rob Frieden, The FCC's Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory
Classifications Affect Competition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275, 1277-78 (2004)
(discussing the effect of regulatory classifications within the FTA and their impact on
competition).
80 Telephone companies had previously been treated as common carriers and were
under the jurisdiction of the ICC. WILSON, supra note 49, 16-18.
81 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 § 1 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (2000)). This particular part of § 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 was
amended in 1996 to include the words "without discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, or sex." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
82 U.S.v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135-36 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter
AT&T].
83 The terms of this consent decree had the long-term effect of preventing AT&T
from entering the computer market. When one considers that AT&T-controlled
laboratories created the transistor, an essential component to the computer, the long-term
effect of this decree may have been beyond that imagined by both parties to the dispute.
See generally Christopher Rhoads, Missed Calls: AT&T Inventions Fueled Tech Boom,
And Its Own Fall, WALL ST. J., Feb: 2, 2005, at Al (noting that many of the inventions
which fueled the technology boom, including the transistor, were created by Bell Labs,
but could not be used by AT&T).
84 MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 87.
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where microwave technology allowed for the transportation of long distance
traffic over the air rather than through wires. 85 This development helped pave
the way for the break up of AT&T's monopoly in 1982.86
The AT&T monopoly ended as a result of a settlement between AT&T
and the Justice Department to an antitrust case originally filed in 1974.87 The
government alleged that:
(i) AT&T's exclusive relationship with Western Electric was illegal; (ii)
AT&T monopolized the long distance service market; (iii) AT&T refused to
interconnect telecommunications competitors as well as customers'
premises equipment, thus being liable for a 'refusal to deal'; (iv) AT&T
used various discriminatory practices that raised the costs of competitors;
(v) AT&T abused the regulatory process and did not provide complete
information to regulators; [and] (vi) AT&T set prices to exclude
competitors, including practicing predatory pricing. 88
The Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) ordered the divestment of AT&T
from its twenty-two operating companies that provided local telephone
service.89  This created seven independent Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs) in place of the previously AT&T-controlled Bell
Operating Companies. 90 Each RBOC maintained monopoly control over the
local loop within its respective region. As a result, each RBOC was
forbidden from entering the long distance market, providing information
services, or manufacturing equipment used on the telephone system (other
than CPEs).9 ' The MFJ allowed AT&T to re-enter the computer market as
85 James Speta cites long distance competition resulting from microwave
transmission as a form of intermodal competition that allowed for previously
monopolized networks to be opened up. Using this example, as well as examples from the
deregulation of railroads, he argues for a new communications law that allows for
decreased legal and economic barriers for intermodal competitors-such as VolP and cell
phones-to the PSTN. See Speta, supra note 8, at 1108-46.
86 See AT&T, supra note 82.
87 Id. at 139. For an extensive narrative discussion detailing the breakup of AT&T's
monopoly, see STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY (1986). For a brief excerpt
describing AT&T's eventual demise, see Leslie Cauley, Book Charts AT&T's Long,
Slippery Slope, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2005, at 4B.
88 Economides, supra note 2, at 470.
89 AT&T, supra note 82, at 141.
90 The seven Regional Operating Companies were Pacific Telesis, US West,
Southwestern Bell, Ameritech, Nynex, Bell Atlantic, and Bell South. BENJAMIN,
LICTHMAN & SHELANSKI, supra note 20, at 673.
91 CPEs are defined as, "Customer Provided Equipment, or Customer Premises
Equipment. Originally it referred to equipment on the customer's premises which had
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well as maintain its status within the market for CPEs and long distance.92
The only restriction placed on AT&T was a seven-year ban on entering the
electronic publishing market. 93 The logic of the MFJ indicated that, divested
from serving the local market, AT&T could do little harm to virtually all
other competitive markets.
In the years following the MFJ, the long distance market gradually
became more competitive. AT&T's market share of total revenue fell from
90.1% in 1984 to 51.8% in 1995. 94 During this time new technologies
emerged, allowing for telephone providers to offer new products including
various types of wireless services. 95 This combination, along with the
elimination of cross-subsidies, reduced prices within the long distance
market. 96 By the end of 1995 it was clear that a competitive market in
telephony was indeed possible.
B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Influenced by the perceived successes of deregulation in other
industries, 97 Congress sought to spur competition in telephony through
deregulation. After years of debate and compromise, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA).98 The FTA amended the 1934
Communications Act, and in doing so maintained the earlier system of
regulation through classification. The stated purpose of the FTA was, "To
promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices
and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies. ' 99
Given that the market for long distance service had become increasingly
been bought from a vendor who was not the local phone company. Now it simply refers
to telephone equipment-key systems, PBXs, answering machines, etc.-which reside
[sic] on the customer's premises." NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at
207.
92 AT&T, supra note 82, at 185.
9 3 Id. at 186.
9 4 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 10-14
(2001).
95 MCMASTER, supra note 47, at 150-51.
9 6 1d. at 151.
97 See Speta, supra note 8, at 1091.
98 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). For a detailed narrative account of many of
the events leading up to and following the passage of the FTA from the perspective of
former FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, see REED E. HuNDT, YOU SAY YOU WANT A
REVOLUTION (2000).
99 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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competitive following the MFJ, the FTA sought to spur telephone
competition at the local level. To accomplish this end, Congress devised a
scheme of deregulation through regulation of the local loop that forced
ILECs to provide CLECs with access to their facilities at discounted rates. 100
The FTA attempts to break apart an ILEC's monopoly position over a
particular area in three different ways. A CLEC may build its own facilities,
purchase wholesale service from an ILEC, or lease elements of an
incumbent's network.10' To spur ILEC cooperation, the FTA allows ILECs
to enter the long distance market provided certain competitive conditions
exist in the local market. 10 2 Additionally, the FTA attempts to limit the role
that state regulatory commissions may play in preventing CLEC entry into
local markets. 103
Under the FTA, if a CLEC decides to take the expensive course of
building its own network, an ILEC must interconnect the CLEC's network
with the incumbent network. 10 4 If a CLEC decides to purchase wholesale
service from an ILEC, 0 5 such service must be provided either through a rate
agreed upon by the ILEC and the CLEC or at a rate determined by state
utility commissions.' 0 6 Under this scenario, a firm with no facilities of its
own must pay the wholesale rate for the service in addition to costs for
marketing, billing, and customer service. 107
00 See 47 U.S.C. §251(b) (2000); 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3) (2000); 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c)(4) (2000).
101 47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (2000).
102 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
103 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000). Discussing the conflict between the FCC and state utility
commissions in the implementation of the FTA, former FCC Chairman Hundt notes:
"After competition developed, we intended to end state regulation of local telephone
prices charged to consumers. We would put the state regulators out of the
communications business. Perhaps that was one of the reasons they did not welcome our
assertion of preemptive federal jurisdiction." HUNDT, supra note 98, at 157.
104 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (2000).
105 Under this provision of the FTA, an ILEC has the duty "to offer for resale at
wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to
subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers[.]" 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(4)(A) (2000).
106 State utility commissions should determine this rate "on the basis of retail rates
charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding the
portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will
be avoided by the local exchange carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(3) (2000).
107 Id.
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The third method of entry for a competitive provider-the leasing of
unbundled network elements at cost-based rates108-has been the "primary
network sharing mechanism" within the FTA, as well as a source of
extensive litigation. 10 9 In the implementation of this provision, Congress
required that ILECs negotiate in "good faith" with CLECs requesting access
to a portion of an ILEC's unbundled network." l0 If an ILEC and a CLEC
cannot agree upon a price, then a state commission must determine a
"nondiscriminatory," "just and reasonable rate for the interconnection of
facilities and equipment.""'i l
What constitutes a "nondiscriminatory," "just and reasonable rate" has
been the source of great contention between the FCC, ILECs, CLECs, and
state utility commissions.112 The FTA provides little guidance for
implementation beyond stating that such a rate should value "the cost . . . of
providing the ... network element [which] may include a reasonable profit"
while disregarding any "reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based
proceeding." 113 In implementing rules interpreting this phrase, the FCC
chose to use TELRIC, 114 a forward-looking process to estimate cost. This
108 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000). The statute states that each ILEC has "[tihe duty to
provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a
telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an
unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." Id.
109 Schneider, Goldman & Hartnett, supra note 46, at 19. The authors also note:
"Predictably, the Act has spawned eight years of litigation, most of which pitted BOC
claims that the regulators were too aggressive, given Congress's desire that competitive
market forces prevail, against competitors' claims that the regulators were not doing
enough ..." Id. at 18. See also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 385 (1999)
(holding that the FCC has jurisdiction to adopt local competition rules which cover
pricing as well as upholding the FCC's rules allowing CLECs to lease all necessary
network elements from ILECs) [hereinafter RIB]; Verizon Commc'ns v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, 535 U.S. 467, 498-500 (2002) (holding that the FCC may require state utility
commissions to use a forward-looking method to determine costs without consideration
of historical or past investment of incumbents); U.S. Telecom Ass'n. v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter USTA I] (ordering the FCC
to revise unbundling rules because its national standard for determining "impairment"
failed to consider competitive realities in local markets); USTA II, supra note 4, at 569.
110 47 U.S.C. §§ 25 l(c)(1), 252 (2000).
11 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (2000).
112 Id. See generally supra note 109.
113 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A) (2000).
114 TELRIC stands for Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost. It is defined as
"the forward-looking cost over the long run of the total quantity of the facilities and
functions that are directly attributable to, or reasonably identifiable as incremental to,
such element, calculated taking as a given the incumbent LEC's provision of other
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
process was challenged unsuccessfully by ILECs as well as state utility
commissions as an unreasonable interpretation of the FTA.115
The FCC's implementation of the FTA was also challenged by ILECs
and state utility commissions as beyond the FCC's authority, because local
competition rules should be set by the states. 116 Although the Supreme Court
held that the FCC had jurisdiction to set local competition rules, 117 the
Commission's initial list of unbundled network elements was invalidated
because the Commission did not consider whether a CLEC's service would
be impaired if any of the unbundled elements were not included. 118 The
Court stated that in determining which elements should be available for
CLECs, the FCC must use, "some limiting standard, rationally related to the
goals of the Act." 119 In response to this holding, the FCC issued a UNE
Remand Order articulating a standard for evaluating which network elements
needed to be unbundled. 120
The FCC's revised impairment standard was challenged by the ILECs as
beyond the scope of the FTA. 12 1 The ILECs successfully argued that the use
of a national standard to determine impairment was inappropriate because
competitive impairment varies by locale.122 The D.C. Circuit explained:
As to almost every element, the Commission chose to adopt a uniform
national rule, mandating the element's unbundling in every geographic
market and customer class, without regard to the state of competitive
impairment in any particular market. As a result, UNEs will be available to
CLECs in many markets where there is no reasonable basis for thinking that
elements." 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b) (2005). To determine cost, a state utility commission
must measure the forward-looking cost based on usage of the most efficient
telecommunications technology, a forward-looking cost of capital, and economic
depreciation rates. Id. A simpler definition is provided by NEWTON'S TELECOM
DICTIONARY which describes TELRIC as "a way of figuring out what phone service
should cost based on the incremental cost of new equipment and new labor, not counting
the embedded cost of old equipment and the labor to install that old equipment."
NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY, supra note 37, at 799.
115 Verizon Commc'ns v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 535 U.S. 467,475 (2002).
116 IUB, supra note 109, at 374.
117 Id. at 377-78.
118 Id. at 387-88.
119 Id. at 388.
12 0 See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696 (1999). The FCC's new standard
stated that a CLEC would be impaired if "lack of access to that element materially
diminishes a requesting carrier's ability to provide the services it seeks to offer." Id. at
51.
121 USTA I, supra note 109, at 417.
122 Id. at 422.
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competition is suffering from any impairment of a sort that might have the
object of Congress's concern. 123
The D.C. Circuit therefore ordered that the FCC revise its unbundling
rules subject to some considerations provided by the court. 124
The FCC responded by once again drafting new standards for
determining impairment. 125 These new standards greatly reduced which
elements of an incumbent's network could be unbundled. Among the
elements that remained capable of being unbundled were the switches
serving residential and local business markets. 126 Switches are considered the
"lynchpin" to providing a circuit that functions from end-to-end in a given
telephone call.127 Under the FCC's new guidelines, lack of access to switches
constituted "impairment" absent evidence to the contrary. 128 To ensure
compliance with USTA Ps call for region-specific standards, the FCC gave
willing state utility commissions the authority to determine if there existed
any local conditions in which lack of access to switches would not constitute
impairment.129
ILECs once again appealed. the Commission's new "impairment" rules
arguing that they did not conform to the D.C. Circuit's holding. 130 The D.C.
Circuit invalidated the FCC's new rules as an unlawful subdelegation of
Commission authority to the states.131 By invalidating the FCC's scheme of
monitoring "impairment" in access to switches, the D.C. Circuit made it
virtually impossible for CLECs to obtain unbundled access to essential
elements of an incumbent's network at state-imposed wholesale rates. This
holding was considered by some CLECs as the equivalent of a death knell to
their ability to compete in the local exchange market. Shortly after the United
States Solicitor General and the FCC announced that the government would
not appeal this ruling, AT&T, the largest CLEC at the time, announced its
plan to stop soliciting new local residential customers and to raise rates on
123 Id.
124ld. at 422, 427-29.
125 Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18
F.C.C.R. 16978 (2003) [hereinafter Unbundling 2003]. The new standards only allowed
competitive inipairment "when lack of access to an incumbent LEC network element
poses a barrier or barriers to entry, including operational and economic barriers, that are
likely to make entry into a market uneconomic." Id. at 84.
126 1d. at 415.
127 Schneider, Goldman & Hartnett, supra note 46, at 20.
128 Unbundling 2003, supra note 125, at M 464-75.
129 Id. at M498-505.
130 USTA II, supra note 4, at 564.
131 Id. at 566.
2005]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
many of its current customers.132 MCI, the second largest CLEC, also
announced that it would consider exiting the residential local market and
noted that further "consolidation" within the industry was now likely. 13 3
The FCC responded to the USTA II decision by issuing new rules for
unbundled network access in February of 2005.134 Under these new rules,
ILECs are no longer required to provide CLECs with unbundled access to
their local switches for the purpose of adding new customers. 135 In addition,
a CLEC whose current customers are served by leased access to local
switches, has one year to develop its own facilities or negotiate new leases
with the ILEC whose switches it is currently using.136 In adopting this new
rule, the FCC noted, "we believe that the attendant increase in incentives to
deploy facilities justify a bar on unbundling even where the competitive
carrier might be 'impaired. '"l 37 To compete in local telephony markets,
CLECs must now either negotiate leases for access to switches with ILECs or
build competing facilities.
Since the passage of the FTA, the telecommunications industry has
changed dramatically. During this time firms have consolidated 138 and delved
into new markets.' 39 In early 2005, MCI's prediction of future industry
consolidation came to fruition as SBC and AT&T announced plans to
merge. 140 Less than two weeks later, MCI became a takeover target as
132 Ken Belson, AT&T Plans to Raise Its Rates for Residential Calling Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2004, at C1.
133 Schneider, Goldman & Hartnett, supra note 46, at 23.
134 See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 70 Fed. Reg. 8940 (Feb. 24, 2005)
[hereinafter Unbundled Access] (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 5 1).
135 Id. at 61. This provision became effective March 11, 2005. Id at 66.
136 Id. at 5.
137 Id. at 61.
138 The seven Regional Operating Companies created by the MFJ and the two large
independent local exchange carriers (GTE and SNET) have been greatly reduced. Pacific
Telesis, Ameritech, and SNET have merged with Southwestern Bell to form SBC
Communications; US West has merged with Qwest; Nynex, Bell Atlantic, and GTE have
merged to form Verizo'n Communications; and BellSouth has remained although it is
frequently the subject of merger rumors with SBC Communications because the two
firms jointly own Cingular Wireless. See BENJAMIN, LICHTMAN & SHELANSKI, supra note
20, at 793 (describing SBC and Verizon's merger activities); Ken Belson, BellSouth,
Indifferent to Mergers, Seems Certain of its Path, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at C2
(noting that despite BellSouth's aversion to large acquisitions, it may be a takeover target
for SBC); Associated Press, FCC Approves Qwest and U.S. West Merger Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000, at C3 (noting FCC 5-0 approval of Qwest/US West merger).
139 See Latour, infra note 148.
140 See Ken Belson, SBC Near Deal to Acquire AT&T for $16 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 2005, at A18.
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Verizon and Qwest made offers to acquire it with Verizon ultimately
prevailing.' 4 ' The SBC/AT&T merger marked a telecommunications
milestone as AT&T, the firm which has played the central role in the creation
of U.S. telephony, became a target for one of its former regional Bell
Operating Companies. In a sense, PSTN telephony has come full circle as
Bell's progeny begin to exert some of the monopoly power once wielded by
their parent. With these recent developments one must wonder where the
future of competitive PSTN telephony lies.
Nearly a decade after the implementation of the FTA, its promise of
robust local competition has failed to materialize, and the future prospects for
competitive local telephony appear doubtful. 142 Yet the telephone market of
the future appears -quite different from the market of the past. A competitive
market for wireless telephony has emerged and there are now more wireless
telephones in the U.S. than there are traditional lines.143 With the
introduction of VoIP and the continuous blurring of the traditional lines
separating cable and telephony, experts have begun to question the efficacy
of the FTA in achieving both its stated purpose and as appropriate legislation
to govern the telecommunications in the future. 144 Nonetheless, the vast
majority of Americans continue to receive service over the PSTN, and if a
new act is necessary, such an act must consider ways to increase competition
amongst PSTN providers as well.
IV. THE POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNET PROTOCOL
When the FCC launched its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR)
regarding VoP, it did not limit its inquiry to concerns about VoIP as a
141 Matt Richtel & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Verizon Agrees to Acquire MCIfor $6.6
Billion, Beating Qwest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at Al; Jesse Eisinger, Subplot in
Contest for MCI: Fast Money vs. the Long Term, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at C1.
142 See Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J., 201, 211
(1996) ("How can an Act that says 'shall' 2036 times be deregulatory?"); Robert W.
Crandall, Local and Long Distance Competition: Replacing Regulation With
Competition, in COMMuNIcATIONs DEREGULATION AND FCC REFORM 53 (Jeffrey A.
Eisenbach & Randall J. May eds., 2001) ("Rather than freeing the entire sector from
government regulation, the 1996 Act established a new, more complicated regulatory
regime that has created controversy, litigation, and only modest progress."); Leslie
Cauley, Consumer Advocates Fear Losing AT&T's Voice, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2005, at
B 1 (discussing the effects of the AT&T/SBC merger on consumer options as well as on
congressional lobbying).
143 Squeo, supra note 18.
144See id; Labaton, supra note 18; Speta, supra note 8, at 1154-55; Stephen




substitute for traditional telephony. Instead, the NOPR examined the diverse
uses of IP-enabled services in general and the potential changes that they will
bring to the communications marketplace. 145 Internet protocol's (IP)
efficiency creates the possibility for the development of new and highly
personalized forms of communication that were previously unavailable
through the PSTN or even through cable networks. The full scope of these
offerings will be realized over time as programmers and users develop
increasingly efficient uses of IP. Nonetheless, it appears that with improved
broadband speeds and technology, it is likely that voice, data, and television
transmission will all converge. 14
6
A. Battle of the Bundles
The telecommunications convergence, made possible through the use of
internet protocol, has already begun eroding traditional boundaries within the
communications industry. Currently, the largest suppliers of broadband
access are incumbent cable and telephone companies. As these companies
compete for broadband users,147 it appears likely that competition over
broadband will mark the frontline of what will be a battle for multiple
telecommunications services. Cable companies have begun offering
145 IP-Enabled Services, supra note 12.
146 For a discussion of the likely effects that this convergence will have on the
competitive and regulatory structure of the communications industry, see Metzger &
Broderick, supra note 26. Without explicitly calling for a new telecommunications act,
Metzger & Broderick predict that this convergence will lead to a technologically neutral
regulatory paradigm. The authors explain:
Thus, the anticipated leveling of the communications playing field will be
realized, not by the expansion of traditional carrier obligations into unregulated
industries, but rather by the expulsion of the anachronistic common carrier
classification with its attendant burdens, accompanied by a "ground up"
redistribution of legal rights and benefits based on fluid technologies and the
existing (rather than historical) economic and social functions of particular
market actors.
Id. at 13. See also Frieden, supra note 79, at 1277 (considering "the consequences
resulting from the creation of legislative definitions which cannot keep pace with quickly
changing and converging technologies in the information, communications and
entertainment ... industries"); Christopher Rhoads & Li Yuan, Talk of the Internet; As
Broadband Proliferates, More Web Users Communicate With One Another By Voice,
WALL ST. J , Aug. 25, 2005, at B 1.
147 See supra note 7.
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telephone service either through VoIP or bundling deals with CLECs. 148
Similarly, some ILECs, such as SBC, have responded by selling direct
broadcast satellite (DBS) television to their customers in bundled
packages. 149 Over the long term, telephone companies plan to lay high speed
fiber optic wire that will be capable of launching new services such as IPTV
(internet protocol television), thereby allowing RBOCs to compete with cable
companies as one-stop telecommunication providers.150 Even the competitive
wireless telephone market may be affected by this convergence because the
nation's two largest wireless carriers are RBOC-controlled.' 51 Such bundled
offerings may prove fatal to competitors who are unable to offer the
discounts that will come with multiple subscriptions as well as the
convenience of a single bill, which is anticipated to attract customers. The
telecommunications landscape may become one of duopoly' 52 between
148 For example, by the summer of 2004, in Omaha, Nebraska the regional cable
company (Cox Communications, Inc.) had more subscribers to its PSTN telephone
service than did the regional Bell operator (ILEC). Almar Latour, Free for All: Telecom
Companies Are Invading One Another's Turf Like Never Before, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
2004, at R1.
149 Id. In a similar strategy, Verizon now offers New York and other subscribers in
East Coast states discounted DirecTV satellite service. Peter Grant, Here Comes Cable
... And It Wants A Big Piece of the Residential Phone Market, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13,
2004, at R4.
150 Verizon has launched a television service delivered over fiber optic wire in select
markets. Peter Grant, Getting Your MTV From the Phone Company, WALL ST. J., Sept.
21, 2005, at D1. See Almar Latour, Showdown of the Giants: Verizon, SBC Saddle Up to
Compete Head to Head With Cable in TV Service, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at B 1.
(discussing SBC and Verizon's plans to launch cable service through new fiber optic
networks). For a discussion of an IPTV launching by British television provider BT, see
Jo Twist, Broadband Set to Revolutionise TV, BBC News (Mar. 9, 2005), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4332337.stm.
151 America's two largest wireless telephone providers are Cingular and Verizon.
After merging with AT&T Wireless, Cingular has approximately 46,007,000 subscribers
and Verizon has 37,552,000 subscribers. Verizon Wireless is a joint venture with Verizon
Communications (which controls 55%) and Vodafone Group PLC. Cingular Wireless is a
joint venture between ILECs SBC Communications, Inc. and BellSouth Corporation.
2004 F.C.C. ANN. REP. 04-216, at 18 n.69, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-04-216A 1 .pdf.
152 Electric companies may emerge as an alternate third provider of high speed
interet access. This technology is known as "broadband over power line" (BPL). The
FCC has issued new requirements and measurement guidelines designed to facilitate BPL
research and deployment. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.601-15.615 (2005). Another possible
competitor may emerge from municipalities that plan to offer wireless service. The
possibility of municipal broadband has been a contentious issue and incumbent
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competing regional cable and telephone providers, leaving small VolP
providers, internet service providers (ISPs), and CLECs shut out from the
competitive market.' 53 Under a duopoly, it is possible that consumers may
see fewer benefits of the competitive market than proponents of deregulation
claim. 154
In the upcoming battle for consumers between cable companies and
ILECs, it appears that cable companies currently hold the upper hand. Many
of the upgrades necessary to supply broadband internet access and VolP were
made as providers switched to digital cable. Since 1996, the cable industry as
a whole has spent over $95 billion upgrading facilities to provide for
enhanced services, with Comcast, the nation's largest cable provider,
spending $39 billion alone.155 As such, the cable industry currently possesses
the greatest bundling capacity, and numerous cable providers are already
offering broadband access, telephony through VoIP, and cable packages over
their own facilities. This eliminates the need for the strategic alliances and
broadband providers have sought to curb such wireless initiatives through intense
lobbying and calls for a congressional ban on municipal broadband. James Dao,
Philadelphia Hopes For Wireless Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2005, at A18 (discussing
the debate over municipal wireless broadband service). If current plans for municipal
broadband prove successful, the government may enter into direct competition with cable
providers and ILECs. Id.
153 See Young & Drucker, supra note 3 ("With their rivals reduced mainly to small
niche companies, the local-phone and cable companies quickly could start to behave like
a classic duopoly in which neither side considers it worthwhile to start a war for market
share."). For a discussion of differing perspectives on this issue, see Riley K. Temple,
Mary Greczyn, & Halprin Temple, Recent Developments in Broadband Regulation, 813
PLIIPAT 175, 206-17 (2004). Arguing on behalf of ISPs, Earthlink CEO Gary Betty told
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation in May of 2004, "So
called facilities-based competition between cable and phone companies is good as far as it
goes, but it only creates a duopoly, or more precisely, a 'double-headed monopoly."' Id.
at 206. Jonathan Krim, Will Providers Provide Equally?, WASH. POST, May 27, 2004, at
El (discussing concerns that broadband providers will favor some applications over
others). Krim reports:
AT&T, which also is jumping into the VoIP market, says it is taking the cable
industry at its word that it will not discriminate. But the company is watching
carefully and worries that the potential for mischief increases as the country
increasingly moves toward a broadband duopoly of the large phone and cable
operators.
Id. (emphasis added).
154 See J.P. Mayberry, J.F. Nash & M. Shubik, A Comparison of Treatments of A
Duopoly Situation, 21 ECONOMETRICA 141, 152 (Jan. 1953) ("We have seen, in this
simplified model, how collusion may tend to restrict production and raise prices and
profits. It is noteworthy that these effects are still quite marked when there are restrictions
('laws') against side payments. It seems, therefore, that such laws or restrictions would
naturally result in implicit collusion.").
155 Hunt,.supra note 34.
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joint ventures that currently characterize ILEC bundling. 156 Additionally, the
facilities upgrades proposed by some regional Bells (ILECs) will take many
years, providing regional cable companies with an advantage in many of the
nation's largest markets. 57
Until recently, cable providers were also aided by the dubious regulatory
classification of new IP-based services. This is best demonstrated by the
uncertainty that surrounded the status of high speed internet access.1 58 The
FCC issued a Declaratory Ruling classifying cable modem service as an
interstate "information service" 159 rather than a "cable service' 160 or a
"telecommunications service." 16 1*The FCC- reached this conclusion because
cable modem service combines the transmission of data with computer
processing, information provision, and computer interactivity, enabling end
users to run a variety of applications. 162 This rationale was upheld by the
Supreme Court in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass 'n v. Brand X
Internet Services.163 Despite the FCC's ruling, it remained unclear if the
same rationale would apply to ILEC broadband facilities or if those facilities
156 See Grant, supra note 149.
157 Id.
158 The problem of regulatory status is crucial to the VolP debate as well. By
continuing to place obligations on providers based on the regulatory classification of their
service, the FTA encourages new entrants as well as existing actors to try to use the
classification scheme to provide a regulatory advantage over similar services. See Rob
Frieden, Regulatory Opportunism in Telecommunications: The Unlevel Competitive
Playing Field, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 81, 99-101 (2001); Frieden, supra note 79, at
1277-78.
159 Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter
Cable Modems]. An "information service" is statutorily defined as the "offering of a
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes
electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of
a telecommunications service." 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
160 Cable service is statutorily defined as, "(A) the one-way transmission to
subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming service, and (B)
subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of such video
programming or other programming service." 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000).
161 Telecommunications service is statutorily defined as, "the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(43) (2000).
162 Cable Modems, supra note 159, at 38.
16 3 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2710
(2005).
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would be considered a "telecommunications service" subject to the FTA's
sharing requirements. This uncertainty was resolved shortly after the Court's
decision in Brand X, when the FCC announced that "wireline broadband
Internet access providers, like cable modem service providers, will be
considered information service providers and will no longer be compelled by
regulation to unbundle and separately tariff the underlying transmission
component of their Internet access service." 164 It now appears that there will
be regulatory parity amongst ILECs and cable providers with respect to
broadband offerings.
ILEC broadband service's regulation by classification is illustrative of
the nature of regulation under the FTA, where providers of a service may
face more or less regulation by a simple shift in the regulatory category in
which they are placed. Although this system was reasonable when it was first
implemented in 1934, the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the current
telecommunications convergence raises questions that the present regulatory
scheme was never intended to answer. Under this system, regulators, rather
than consumers, will be picking winners and. losers in the
telecommunications marketplace. 165 As IP apparati continue to reshape the
telecommunications industry, one is forced to ask if the current system of
regulation by classification remains viable.
B. Neutral Networks
Complicating the prospects of a competitive marketplace are concerns
over network neutrality. 166 If the broadband access that is necessary for IP
services such as VolP is only available through cable modem or DSL, then
cable companies and ILECs could potentially limit the uses of IP services by
their customers. 167 Customers may be limited in their choice of or the quality
164 Press Release, FCC, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on the Adoption of
Wireline Broadband Access Order (Aug. 5, 2005), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-260433A2.pdf. See 2005 F.C.C.
REP. & ORDER 05-125, available at http://www.fcc.gov/FCC-05-150AI.pdf, for the
complete order.
165 Frieden, supra note 79, at 1277.
166 Network neutrality is the maintenance of the internet as an outlet for all
applications as opposed to favored uses. A neutral network would allow all uses to be
developed. Regulation would be required to guarantee network neutrality and there have
been strong arguments made both for and against it. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality,
Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141 (2003). For an
argument in favor of network neutrality, see id
167 The FCC has already faced its first case of an incumbent broadband provider
blocking VoIP traffic. The FCC settled with Madison River Communications Corp. after
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of VolP or other enhanced IP service providers by the terms of their
broadband connection. The Yankee Group, a market research firm, released a
study that is pessimistic about the future of small VolP providers. 168 One
analyst noted:
It may seem like a dodgy competitive tactic, but broadband network
providers could slow down Vonage's service. As subscribers increase their
use of latency sensitive and graphic rich ... traffic, broadband providers
could give network precedence to their own revenue-generating services.
Unless Vonage pays fees to the network provider, there is no reason the
operator should not make the service a lower priority on the network. 169
Another study of network neutrality found that "broadband operators'
networks and usage restrictions favored the applications of the late 1990s
(primarily the World Wide Web and other client-server applications), and
disfavored more recent applications ... like home networking, peer-to-peer
applications, and home telecommuting."' 70 Amongst broadband providers,
cable companies generally placed more contractual restrictions on customers
than providers of DSL.171 Advocates for network neutrality, such as
Microsoft and Yahoo, argue that without government regulation, broadband
providers will have the opportunity to discriminate against new or competing
applications, thereby stunting IP development. 172
Opponents of network neutrality argue that a free market approach will
produce the optimal availability of IP services without the costs and burdens
associated with regulation. 173 If customers insist on network neutrality,
opponents argue, then broadband providers will be forced to comply with
consumer demands or risk losing customers to a competitor with fewer
the firm allegedly blocked voice data for nearly 200 Vonage customers. Under the terms
of the agreement, Madison River Communications agreed to pay $15,000 and to stop
blocking VolP traffic. FCC Commissioner Powell expressed a desire to deal with cases of
VolP-blocking on a case-by-case basis. Jonathan Krim, Phone Company Settles in
Blocking ofInternet Calls, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2005, at E2.
168 Krim, supra note 153.
169 Id.
170 Wu, supra note 166, at 157.
171 Id.
172 See Temple, Greczyn & Temple, supra note 153, at 207.
173 See James Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open
Access, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 76-88 (2000) (positing that open access rules are
unnecessary and possibly harmful because consumer demand for broadband access
platform will force providers to have open networks). See also Phil Weiser, Paradigm
Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 819, 832-37 (2000)
(arguing for a limited regulatory role in ensuring open access).
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network restrictions. 174 Finally, opponents argue, broadband providers could
work out agreements to give priority to some content over other content. 175
Under this scenario, the network would be biased toward firms that place the
highest value on user access to their IP services.
The FCC briefly addressed these concerns when it released a policy
statement designed to "preserve and promote the open and interconnected
nature of public Internet." 176 In this statement the FCC articulated four
policies that will guide its future policymaking decisions. 177 These policies
include:
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their
choice; (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and services of their
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3) consumers are entitled
to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network; and
(4) consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers. 178
These statements indicate the FCC's desire to promote a neutral internet.
Nonetheless, the FCC chose not to adopt these principles as formal rules and
it is currently unclear how they will affect future decisions. 179
Concerns over network neutrality are indicative of the uncertainty
surrounding the future of American telecommunications. While the FCC's
policy articulation demonstrates a desire to promote competition and
innovation, it is unclear how this policy will be implemented and what role
regulators will play. As voice, broadband, and video service merge, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the FTA is not only ill-equipped to achieve
its goal of fostering competition in traditional telephony, it also provides a
limited framework for regulating the telecommunications offerings of the
future. For the possibilities of internet protocol to be fully realized, there
must be a regulatory scheme that fosters innovation and allows America's
telecommunications technologies, both new and old, to thrive through
competition.
174 Speta, supra note 173, at 76.
175 Id.
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V. REGULATING THE REVOLUTION
Congress provided a strong signal with the Telecommunications Act of
1996 that competition should be paramount in the regulation of the
telecommunications industry. Nonetheless, some industry analysts argue that
the "silo" approach that the FTA continued to use is no longer compatible
with emerging technologies. 180 It is also argued that any effort to fix the Act
by employing a similar approach will hamper competition as Well as
technological development..181 When one combines these criticisms with the
FTA's failure to foster robust local competition, it becomes clear that the
time has come for a new Act.182
In developing the framework for a new Act, it is necessary to keep in
mind that many Americans will continue to use traditional telephony. 183 If
the PSTN remains the primary method through which millions of Americans
place their telephone calls, then the need for competitive providers of PSTN
180 Frieden, supra note 79, at 1277-78; John T. Nakahata, Broadband Regulation at
the Demise of the 1934 Act: The Challenge of Muddling Through, 12 CoMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 169, 169 (2004) ("If the technological assumptions underlying the Act's
core statutory framework are indeed collapsing, then the challenge for the Commission is
how to muddle through to best achieve sound public policy-and some degree of
regulatory certainty-in a statutory environment that will be fraught with artificial, legacy
statutory distinctions.").
181 Members of Congress concerned about the status of VolP under the existing FTA
framework have introduced legislation to preempt state authority except in the areas of
state Universal Service Funds, 911 programs, and compensation among phone
companies. See VolP Regulatory Freedom Act of 2004, S. 2281, 108th Cong. (2004);
VolP Regulatory Freedom Act of 2004, H.R. 4129, 108th Cong. (2004).
182 Alfred Kahn describes the FTA's failure to promote effective local competition:
"Again as in the case of airlines, the unintended adverse consequences of deregulation in
telecommunications not only offer no good reason to re-regulate and re-cartelize the
industry; they counsel an early abandonment of oxymoronic efforts to promote
competition by regulation." ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH 23 (2003).
183 Although VolP is becoming widely available, a recent study found that only 40%
of those questioned knew what VolP was, and once participants learned "that VolP
operates like existing telephone service, but will be cheaper and can provide additional
features," 71% expressed an interest in switching to it. Carol Wilson, VON: Consumers
Not Thrilled By Cheap VoIP, TELEPHONY ONLINE, Mar. 8, 2005,
http://telephonyonline.com/voip/news/von voipconsumers_030805/index.html. An
interesting finding by this survey was that interest in VolP "dropped dramatically"
amongst the 60% of respondents who had not heard of VolP when its price fell below a
monthly fee of $35..Id.
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service remains vital.184 Nonetheless, the state of telecommunications should
not remain stagnant by regulating new technologies with legacy approaches.
In creating a new Telecommunications Act, arguments that have been posited
in favor of a relaxed regulatory approach for new technologies, such as VolP,
should apply-when possible-to the regulation of traditional telephony.
A. The VoIP Debate
The introduction of Vol? has fostered much debate concerning its
regulatory status under the FTA. In IP-Enabled Services, former FCC
Chairman Powell noted that the differences between IP services and
traditional telecommunications services justify a differing regulatory
structure. 185 Powell explained: "[W]e cannot simply contort the character of
the Internet to suit our familiar notions of regulation. We will not dumb down
the genius of the web to match the limited vision of a regulator."'186 Powell's
comments indicate a preference for the very limited regulation of IP services.
His sentiments are echoed in many of the responses filed with the
Commission. 187 These comments, written from diverse perspectives, argued
both for and against extensive regulation of Volp. 188
184 Despite the advances in the quality of VolP's service, Consumer Reports notes:
"VolP isn't yet the equal of landline. Judging from our panelists' experiences, installation
difficulties, voice quality, and problems with incoming calls put VolP at a disadvantage
at present. Most panelists said they wouldn't want to keep VoP. For them, the
inconvenience outweighed the prospect of lower bills." Internet Phoning-Should You
Try It?, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2005, at 17.
185 IP-Enabled Services, supra note 12, at 4952.
186 Id. (emphasis added).
187 See, e.g., In the Matter of IP-Enabled Services: Comments of Microsoft
Corporation, No. 04-36, at i (May 28, 2004),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or_pdf=pdf&id document=651619
9730 [hereinafter Microsoft Comments] (arguing that the following regulatory principles
should guide VoIP regulation: 1) "Innovation Requires a Regime of Light Regulation;" 2)
"FCC Action Should Account for the Differences Between Networks;" 3) "Solutions
Should Focus on Objectives, not Means;" 4) "Consumer Choice must be Preserved"); In
the Matter of IP-Enabled Services: Comments of National Cable & Telecommunications
Association, No. 04-36, at 3-5 (May 28, 2004),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or pdf=pdf&id-document=651619
9546 [hereinafter NCTA Comments] ("Only regulations essential to preserving public
health, safety and related concerns should be imposed on VolP, however. Regardless of
how VoIP is classified under the Communications Act, overregulation will almost
certainly delay and frustrate the growth of this exciting new service."); In the Matter of
IP-Enabled Services: Comments of the United States Telecom Association, No. 04-36, at
3 (May 28, 2004),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native orjpdf=pdf&iddocument=651619
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Central to the question of the regulation of VolP is what roles the states
and the federal government should play.189 Those who favor an exclusive
federal role often argue for preemption based on the difficulty and potential
costs of differentiating interstate VolP traffic from intrastate traffic.190
Conversely, those who argue in favor of an increased state role note the
functional similarities of traditional telephony and VolP. 19' These arguments
are rooted in the regulatory structure of the FTA, an act whose system of
regulation by classification appears ill-equipped to deal with IP-enhanced
services.
Many arguments in favor of a relaxed regulatory approach note that such
an approach is necessary for the development and deployment of new
technologies. 192 Without a relaxed regulatory environment, a VolP provider
could face regulation under fifty-one different regulatory schemes. This
notion is articulated in the USTA Comments which argue: "[T]he burden of
state economic regulation on interstate commerce would be extraordinary, as
the states would be undermining the deregulation that the Commission has
determined in related contexts [Cable Modems] (and should determine here)
creates the best environment for investment in and deployment of interstate
IP-enabled services." 193 By subjecting a firm to up to fifty different state
regulatory schemes, state economic regulation significantly increases both
7736 [hereinafter USTA Comments] ("The Commission's decisions should uniformly be
grounded in (1) the power of free markets to unleash innovation and bring benefits to
consumers; (2) the need to treat all service providers even-handedly so as not to pick
winners and losers through regulation; and (3) the imperative of protecting important
social goals, including universal service, access to emergency services, and disability
access.").
188 This Note will mainly discuss the comments filed against extensive regulation of
VoIP.
189 In Vonage, the FCC preempted federal jurisdiction for the regulation of VoIP.
Vonage, supra note 10, at 22,404.
190 See In the Matter of IP-Enabled Services: Comments of Cisco Systems, Inc., No.
04-36, at 45 (May 28, 2004),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=651619
8790 [hereinafter Cisco Comments] ("Without information about the traffic's
jurisdictional course, it is similarly impossible to separate IP-enabled traffic into intrastate
r.nd interstate components.").
191 See In the Matter of IP-Enabled Services: Comments of the National Governors
Association, No. 04-36, at 4 (May 28, 2004),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native or__df=pdf&iddocument=651619
8475 ("[I]t is important to maintain the national federal-state framework established by
Congress as part of the 1996 Act.").
192 See supra note 188.
193 USTA Comments, supra note 187, at 36.
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the cost of entry and a firm's operating expenses. 194 Consequently,
proponents of light regulation of VolP emphasize the expense of regulation
in both financial and practical terms. Under this rationale, more regulation
yields higher costs (which are translated to the consumer), fewer options, and
less innovation. 195
Regulation is generally divided into two forms: economic and social. 196
Although most advocates of a light regulatory approach to VoIP argue for
limited (if any) economic regulation, they differ on the need for social
regulations, such as 911 service, 197 access for people with disabilities, and
CALEA.198 Both the United States Telecom Association (USTA) 199 and the
19 4 In Vonage, the FCC expresses agreement with this rationale. It explains:
Allowing Minnesota's order to stand would invite similar imposition of 50 or
more additional sets of different economic regulations .... We cannot, and will not,
risk eliminating or hampering this innovative advanced service that facilitates
additional consumer choice, spurs technological development and growth of
broadband infrastructure, and promotes continued development and use of the
Internet. To do so would ignore the Act's express mandates and directives with
which we must comply, in contravention of the pro-competitive deregulatory
policies the Commission is striving to further.
Vonage, supra note 10, at 22,427.
195 PSTN customers pay significantly higher taxes/fees/surcharges on their bill
compared to VoIP customers. PSTN fees range from $5.50 to more than $13, whereas
VolP surcharges range from $0 to $5. Peter W. Huber & Evan T. Leo, Competition in the
Provision of Voice Over IP and Other IP-Enabled Services (Prepared for and Submitted
by Bellsouth, Qwest, SBC, and Verizon), No. 04-36, at 18 (May 28, 2004),
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf-pdf&iddocument=651619
9328.
196 See Robert W. Crandall, An End to Economic Regulation? 2, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/papers/crandall/20030721.pdf ("Economists
generally distinguish between 'economic' and 'social' regulation. The former is the
control of prices, service quality, and entry conditions in specific sectors, such as
transportation, communications, and energy. The latter is the regulation of risks to health,
safety, and the environment.").
197 The FCC ordered VoP providers whose service allows users to receive calls
from and place calls over the PSTN to provide enhanced 911 capabilities to their
customers. 2005 F.C.C. REP & ORDER 05-116, at 1, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-05-116AI.pdf [hereinafter E911
Order].
198 CALEA is the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. This Act
requires telecommunications operators and manufacturers to build the capability to assist
authorized law enforcement authorities with intercepting "all wire and electronic
communications" and "call-identifying information." 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000). The FCC
has ruled that facilities-based broadband providers as well as interconnected VolP
providers must comply with CALEA. 2005 F.C.C. REP & ORDER 05-153, at IM 26, 41,.
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National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA)200 argue that
VoIP providers should abide by CALEA, provide customer access to
91 1/E911 capabilities, and provide services to persons with disabilities. 20 1
Additionally, both the NCTA and the USTA argue that some form of
universal service funding should be applied to VoP, provided that the FCC
revises its current method of universal service funding.202 These views
recognize the need for social regulation, yet emphasize that regulations
seeking to move beyond what is socially useful are highly suspect and should
be avoided in the national VoIP market. The FCC's decisions to preempt
state utility commissions in the regulation of VolP while mandating E911203
and CALEA 204 access to certain VoIP providers indicate the Commission's
willingness to limit economic regulation while maintaining social
regulations. These decisions can be interpreted as distinguishing regulations
that are necessary to address social concerns from those that stifle innovation
and competition.
B. Rethinking Regulation
The VoTP debate provides an intriguing framework through which one
may observe both the failures of the current telecommunications regulatory
structure and the possibilities of a new approach. In addition, it offers a way
of evaluating what should be viewed as absolutely necessary in a national
regulatory scheme and that which is potentially harmful to the functioning of
a competitive market. While examining arguments in favor of a relaxed
regulatory approach to VoIP, one should ask whether the technological
differences between VoI and traditional telephony justify differing
regulatory treatment, or if these differences are emphasized by VoIP
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-153A 1.pdf
[hereinafter Broadband CALEA Order].
199 The USTA is "the nation's oldest trade organization for the local exchange
carrier industry." USTA Comments, supra note 187, at 1.
200 The NCTA is the trade organization that represents cable operators serving more
than 90% of American cable subscribers. NCTA Comments, supra note 187, at 1.
201 NCTA Comments, supra note 187, at 16; USTA Comments, supra note 189, at
36-42. But see Microsoft Comments, supra note 187, at 18 ("The Commission should
first allow the marketplace to resolve these issues. Even where an IP voice service
substitutes for POTS [plain old telephone system], any necessary social regulation should
account for the nature of IP networks.").
202 NCTA Comments, supra note 187, at 17; USTA Comments, supra note 187, at
37-38.
203 E91 1 Order, supra note 197.
204 Broadband CALEA Order, supra note 198.
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proponents merely to avoid legacy regulations. 20 5 If these arguments are
made to avoid regulatory classifications, then, by divorcing them from the
current regulatory structure, it is possible to see their applicability to
traditional telephony.
Although end-to-end analysis of calls placed over the PSTN is possible,
some of the other arguments for federal preemption of VolP may also apply
to traditional telephony. Despite the FTA's call for increased local
competition, ILECs have maintained their stronghold in the market.206 If
greater competition is to be achieved, it is imperative that there be minimal
barriers to local entry. Nonetheless, current state economic regulations pose
the same barrier to CLEC entry that is decried by proponents of light VolP
regulation. With this reality, one must wonder why calls for the need for
innovation and a consistent regulatory scheme should not apply to local
telephony. Given the uphill battle that CLECs face in the relatively
entrenched market for local telephony, it is imperative that they operate under
a regulatory scheme designed to foster innovation and investment.
If the regulatory roles of the fifty state utility commissions were largely
curtailed, then the FCC's ruling that CLECs must provide their own facilities
or negotiate commercial leases with ILECs could usher in new
competition.20 7 The logic of the Unbundled Access ruling was that leased
access at government-imposed wholesale rates created disincentives for both
CLECs and ILECs to invest in their own facilities, thereby harming
competition. 20 8 This view is reminiscent of Justice Breyer's separate opinion
in IUB in which he notes:
Increased sharing by itself does not automatically mean increased
competition. It is in the un-shared, not in the shared, portions of the
enterprise that meaningful competition would likely emerge. Rules that
force firms to share every resource or element of a business would create
not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, not the
marketplace, would set the relevant terms.2 09
205 See Frieden, supra note 158, at 81 ("Over the years, incumbents and newcomers
alike have gamed the regulatory process to secure a competitive advantage in terms of
reduced regulation or cost savings. With skillful maneuvering, a largely unregulated
venture can provide services functionally equivalent to those offered by a substantially
regulated carrier.").
206 See supra Part III.B.
207 Unbundled Access, supra note 134, at 5, 61.
2 08 Id. at 61.
209 IUB, supra note 109, at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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For Justice Breyer, local competition will only emerge when CLECs
create their own facilities in areas where such redundant networks will not be
wasteful.210
The building of new networks requires a regulatory structure that
encourages investment and provides a relatively low cost of entry-the
opposite of what many VolP commentators describe as the effect of the
current scheme of telephone regulation.211 Just as proponents of relaxed
VolP regulation note that the imposition of differing (and sometimes
contradictory) regulatory obligations by state utility commissions may
discourage new entrants from entering the market, such obligations are
equally harmful to providers of traditional telephony.
Regulating VolP services that are used as a substitute for traditional
telephony in a manner different from PSTN service picks "winners and
losers" in the same way that is criticized by proponents of a relaxed
regulatory structure for VolP.212 To allow VolP to compete directly with
traditional telephony while regulating the two differently will create a
regulatory bias in favor of VolP. While one may make the case that the
extensive capabilities of VolP make it an altogether different service rather
than a substitute, this argument fails to allow consumers to determine how
VoP should be used.213 Allowing the market to be the true arbiter of success
in the telecommunications industry means that all participants in that market
should exist on a level playing field. Given VoP's technological superiority
and efficiency, it makes little sense to burden traditional telephony with
regulations that impose additional costs on an already more expensive
platform.
Just as VoP should not be burdened by legacy telephone regulations, it
is time for those regulations to no longer saddle traditional telephony. In the
years ahead, innovation and the integration of new technologies will be
necessary for any telephone provider, whether its offerings are in the form of
local exchange service or VoP. Innovation may take differing forms that are
representative of the technological differences between PSTN telephony and
VoP as well as the new realities of a changed telecommunications
marketplace. For example, declining revenues in PSTN service as well as
2 10 1UB, supra note 109, at 415-418.
211 See NCTA Comments, supra note 187, at 3-5.
2 12 See USTA Comments, supra note 187, at 3.
213 See Microsoft Comments, supra note 187, at 4 ("Even where an IP-enabled
service is substitutable for a traditionally regulated service, traditional regulation should
not be reflexively applied. IP networks are different, and the FCC's approach must
recognize differences in network structure and capability and the resulting differences in
the way services are composed and delivered over those networks.").
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increased competition from cable providers may ultimately create new
incentives for ILECs to negotiate more favorable leases with CLECs for
network elements. Such an approach may be necessary to combat steadily
declining PSTN profits or to help finance the building of new ILEC
networks.214
In addition to suggesting the need for a relaxed regulatory approach for
all of telephony, the VoIP debate also provides insight into what regulations
should by viewed as necessary under a new regulatory scheme. The
comments to the IP-Enhanced Services inquiry indicate that even some of the
most ardent defenders of limited regulation for VoIP are nonetheless
receptive to applying some legacy social regulations to VoIP.215 Even those
parties who were generally opposed to most forms of VoIP regulation
recognized the potential need for it in areas where market forces could not
yield an appropriate solution.216 Perhaps most surprising amongst these
comments is the recognition of the need for universal service in an IP
world.217
Just as providing 911 service, access to people with disabilities, universal
service, and allowing local law enforcement to perform wiretapping are
viewed as necessary for the deployment of VoIP, so too have they been, and
will continue to be, essential in the provision traditional telephony. It is in
public interest areas such as these that the technology differences between
VoP and traditional telephony are secondary to their functional uses. The
VoP debate therefore may be used as an indicator of what should be
considered essential services in any future system of telecommunications
2 14 See Schneider, Goldman & Hartnett, supra note 46, at 23 ("If the ILECs face loss
of retail customers to cable providers, they might well begin to view CLEC wireline
competition as the lesser of two evils. After all, a wholesale customer is better than no
customer at all."). A successful example of an upstart -firm negotiating leases with a
network owner may be seen in the wireless industry. Sprint has generated substantial
revenues by leasing access to its PCS network to Virgin Mobile which then uses the
network to carry prepaid wireless calls. Roger 0. Crockett, Sprint to the Head of the
Pack: By Following Some Unusual Strategies, the Carrier is Blowing Past Competitors,
Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 2004, at 90. Although the wireless industry differs from traditional
telephony in that wireless does not require a local loop, this example of competitors
negotiating leases that result in the offering of competing and/or innovative products
serves as an example of how facilities owners may seek to gain new additional profits
from the PSTN.
2 15 NCTA Comments, supra note 187, at 3-5.
216 For example, one of Microsoft's five "Core Regulatory Principles" states that
"IP-enabled services should be regulated only to the extent that they are a substantial
replacement for traditionally regulated sergices and innovators have failed to resolve
important social or economic problems." Microsoft Comments, supra note 187, at 3.
217 See supra note 202.
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regulation. As such, under a new national regulatory scheme, regulators must
continue their role of ensuring the provisioning of these and possibly other
social regulations. 218
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of telephony is a history rife with regulation. For over
seventy years, telecommunications has been divided into distinct categories
to determine a provider's regulatory obligations. With the introduction of
VolP and the potential for new IP-enhanced services. these traditional
bcundaries are no longer tenable. In reforming telecommunications
regulation to meet the realities of a new marketplace, one must not make the
mistake of organizing tomorrow's technologies with yesterday's
classifications. Nonetheless, in an effort to draft a forward-looking regulatory
structure, it is also imperative that the PSTN, a network which continues to
be used by the vast majority of Americans, not be forgotten.219
The FTA's failure to establish competitive markets for local service
indicates that a change to the status quo is necessary if serious local PSTN
competition is to emerge. The arguments that have been used to justify a
relaxed regulatory approach to VolP provide an intriguing challenge to this
status quo. Through their application to the PSTN, it is possible to envision a
regulatory environment that fosters local competition without sacrificing
important social regulations. The time has come to shift our
telecommunications discourse away from the applicability of legacy
regulations to new services, and toward the feasibility of applying regulations
designed for new services to the PSTN.
218 This is similar to the approach taken in the proposed VolP Regulatory Freedom
Act of 2004, see supra note 181.
2 19 The FCC's most recent study of telephone service notes that there are roughly
183,042,370 traditional telephone lines in the United States. TELEPHONE TRENDS, supra
note 3, at 7-3. Although this number has been decreasing since 2000, most Americans
will continue to be served by the PSTN for years to come.
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